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 TRIAL TACTICS
Rules such as Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) and its state counterparts permit prosecutors to offer evidence that a criminal defendant 
engaged in uncharged misconduct to prove a number 
of things that may be relevant in a particular pros-
ecution. If  the government must prove knowledge 
and/or intent, other act evidence is often a persua-
sive way to do it. And, although the government is 
rarely required to prove motive as an element of 
a crime (with hate crimes being a principal excep-
tion), other act evidence that proves motive offers 
a powerful and persuasive explanation as to why a 
defendant committed a charged crime.
The most basic proposition governing rules such 
as Rule 404(b) is that the evidence must be offered 
for a permissible purpose, not to prove the defen-
dant’s propensity to commit the crime(s) charged. 
These rules—unlike Rules 413 and 414—strictly pro-
hibit the use of  propensity evidence. Thus, when 
the prosecutor offers Rule 404(b) evidence and the 
defendant objects, the trial judge typically requires 
the prosecutor to identify the permissible purpose(s) 
for which the evidence is offered, rules on whether 
the evidence is relevant to prove the permissible 
purpose(s), and considers whether, even if  relevant, 
evidence should be excluded as unduly prejudicial 
pursuant to rules such as Rule 403.
If  the prosecutor surmounts the defendant’s 
objections, the evidence will be admitted and the 
prosecutor is free to argue to the jury that the evi-
dence does in fact prove what the prosecutor has 
offered it to prove. What the prosecutor may not 
do, however, is make an argument that amounts to 
a propensity argument, i.e., asking the jury to con-
vict the defendant because he or she is the kind of 
person who commits the charged crime(s). But in the 
heat of closing argument, prosecutors can slip and 
move from proper argument regarding the permis-
sible purpose(s) for which the evidence was admitted 
into a propensity argument. Such a slip can put a 
conviction in jeopardy.
A Sample Case: The Facts
United States v. Richards, 719 F.3d 746 (7th Cir. 
2013), illustrates how a prosecutor succeeded in 
having other act evidence admitted, obtained a con-
viction, and lost it on appeal when the appellate 
court determined that the prosecutor erred in mak-
ing a propensity argument. Theodore Richards was 
convicted in district court of possession with intent 
to distribute cocaine. The court of appeals reversed 
his conviction because of the closing argument.
A joint federal and state police contingent was 
engaged in surveillance at a house in Bolingbrook, 
Illinois, where an undercover police officer was to 
purchase a large amount of cocaine from a high-
level drug dealer. Before the scheduled purchase, 
the undercover officer met with the dealer at his 
ranch in another city in Illinois. On the day of the 
purchase, the officer backed his car into the garage 
of the Bolingbrook house, where the dealer’s men 
loaded 10 kilograms of cocaine into a compartment 
in the car that they could access through the trunk. 
The undercover officer then left, but other police 
continued surveillance of the house, as the under-
cover officer suspected additional drugs remained.
Twenty minutes later, a pickup truck arrived at 
the house and the driver got out, went inside the 
house, and shortly returned to the truck. A sur-
veillance officer followed the truck and saw it meet 
a grey Lexus in a mall parking lot. Although the 
drivers did not appear to communicate, the Lexus 
followed the truck back to the Bolingbrook house, 
where the Lexus backed into the garage and the 
garage door closed. Ten minutes later, the garage 
door opened and the Lexus drove away. A surveil-
lance officer tailed the Lexus, and upon learning 
that it was, indeed, cocaine that had been loaded 
into the undercover officer’s trunk, the surveillance 
officer stopped the Lexus, in which Richards was 
driving with a woman passenger.
Although Richards had violated no traffic laws, 
the officer obtained a driver’s license and vehicle reg-
istration in the course of questioning Richards and 
the passenger. Richards told the officer that he had 
flown in from California, had picked up the woman 
to go on a date, and they were on their way to get 
some food. The woman confirmed this story and 
said they had been playing video games at another 
house. Neither Richards nor the woman said any-
thing about having visited the Bolingbrook house.
Police searched the car without consent and found 
a backpack containing 10 kilograms of  cocaine. 
Proper and Improper  
Use of Other Act Evidence
BY STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG
STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG is the Wallace 
and Beverley Woodbury University Professor 
at George Washington University School of 
Law in Washington, D.C. He is a past chair 
of the Criminal Justice Section and a regular 
columnist for Criminal Justice magazine. 
He is also author of the book, Trial Tactics, 
Third Edition (American Bar Association 2013), an updated 
and expanded compilation of his columns.
Published in Criminal Justice, Volume 28, Number 4, Winter 2014. © 2014 by the American Bar Association. Reproduced with  
permission. All rights reserved. This information or any portion thereof may not be copied or disseminated in any form or by any  
means or stored in an electronic database or retrieval system without the express written consent of the American Bar Association.
 TRIAL TACTICS
Both Richards and the woman denied ownership of 
the bag. The government ultimately charged Rich-
ards with possession of the bag with the intent to 
distribute the cocaine.
The Defense
Richards testified in his own behalf. His defense was 
that he thought the bag contained money rather than 
drugs. He testified that he had borrowed $50,000 
“from some Latinos that he knew collectively only 
as the Pelon brothers” to start a trucking company 
with his cousin; the company failed when his cousin 
(who was to be the driver) got sick; and the Pelons 
asked him to transport several packages for them to 
help repay the debt. He further testified that he had 
opened each of the packages—against the Pelons’ 
orders—and found that all contained money. Rich-
ards testified that he obtained his instructions from 
the Pelons at their ranch, where about 30 people 
were “doing work and doing things” and everyone 
called each other “Pelon.” He said he believed the 
Pelons wanted his trips to remain a secret because 
they ran businesses such as strip clubs and pros-
titution and may have been involved with drugs 
and in smuggling people over the border. Richards 
swore that he had been told to travel to Chicago to 
transport money, which is what he thought he was 
transporting when the police stopped and searched 
the Lexus he was driving.
Other Act Evidence
On cross-examination, the government asked Rich-
ards if  he had ever talked on the phone with a man 
named Juan Beltran and whether he had talked 
with Beltran or another person about the need to 
obtain drugs. Richards admitted using marijuana 
but denied discussing cocaine with anyone.
The government put on a brief  rebuttal case. 
DEA Agent Riley had monitored a wiretap on 
Beltran’s phone in an unrelated investigation. He 
testified that Beltran also went by the name “Pelon,” 
identified taped conversations in which Beltran and 
Richards discussed drug quantity and quality, and 
offered the opinion that the language they used 
indicated that they were talking about cocaine—
although neither man specifically mentioned any 
drug by name.
Richards objected to the testimony on the ground 
that there was no evidence that Beltran was the same 
Pelon who had sent Richards to Bolingbrook. But 
the government argued that the evidence rebutted 
Richards’s claim that he was completely ignorant 
of how the drug trade worked and was relevant to 
prove the defendant’s knowledge that there were 
drugs in the backpack. The trial judge agreed and 
admitted some, but not all, of the taped conversa-
tions between Richards and Beltran.
Closing Argument
The prosecutor lost little time during closing argu-
ment in calling Richards a “cocaine dealer” and a 
“drug trafficker.” The defense objected that this was 
propensity evidence, but the district judge admon-
ished defense counsel for interrupting closing 
argument and instructed the jury not to infer guilt 
solely from evidence of past acts. The prosecutor 
repeated the “cocaine dealer” and “drug trafficker” 
language in the first closing argument. In rebuttal 
closing argument, the prosecutor referred to the 
taped Richards/Beltran conversations as “Califor-
nia calls” and relied exclusively on those calls to 
support its characterization of Richards as a cocaine 
dealer and drug trafficker:
•	 The only thing that is disputed is whether the 
defendant knew he had just picked up ten 
kilograms of cocaine. And in answering that 
question think about what is reasonable and 
what makes sense. And there is [sic] two things 
in particular that will help you answer that 
question. The defendant is a cocaine dealer 
and the defendant is a liar.
•	 But if  we have met our burden on the instruc-
tion that will be given, then the California 
calls are absolutely relevant to knowledge and 
intent on November 21st. And the Judge will 
instruct you as much. To think that that is not 
relevant is absurd. He is a cocaine dealer.
•	 The problem is you have heard what the defen-
dant sounds like when he doesn’t think anyone 
is listening, when he doesn’t think anyone is 
watching. You heard the calls. You reviewed 
the transcripts. When he doesn’t think anyone 
is listening, he is a cocaine dealer. When he 
thinks people are watching and listening, he is 
back to poor me, I was just delivering money 
to pay back the loan. That is absurd.
•	 And we are not saying the ten kilos of cocaine 
were connected to the intercepted call from 
California. We are not arguing that. We are 
not saying that. Clearly the defendant’s drug 
dealing is not limited to California. It hap-
pens here too.
•	 These layers of concealment are used to give 
drug dealers plausible deniability. But that 
doesn’t work for the defendant because we 
already know he is a cocaine dealer.
(Id. at 753–54.)
On Appeal: Admissibility of the Tapes
The court of  appeals held that the district judge 
did not abuse discretion in admitting the taped con-
versations. It found that the government offered 
the evidence to prove knowledge—a permissible 
non-propensity purpose—and that Richards had 
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placed knowledge in issue when he testified that he 
thought the backpack contained money and not 
drugs The court acknowledged that in prior cases 
such as United States v. Miller, 673 F.3d 688 (7th Cir. 
2012), it had held that prior bad act evidence is inad-
missible when the defendant asserts innocence in a 
more general way or argues that his or her conduct 
fails to satisfy some element of the crime other than 
knowledge and intent. Miller had contended that 
the drugs belonged to his girlfriend and did not dis-
pute intent or knowledge, and the court of appeals 
concluded that the use of prior convictions for drug 
offenses amounted to propensity use, whereas Rich-
ards directly and specifically disputed knowledge.
The court of appeals also found Beltran’s alias of 
“Pelon” connected him to the ranch where Richards 
got his instructions. This warranted an inference that 
when Richards discussed drugs with Beltran, Rich-
ards knew of drug trafficking originating from the 
ranch. The court agreed with Richards that if  the 
California calls had captured some generic conver-
sation about drugs that was completely unconnected 
to the drug operation that caused Richards to travel 
to Bolingbrook, they would amount to propensity 
evidence if  offered to prove knowledge.
Finally, the court found that the taped calls were 
similar enough and close enough in time to be 
relevant and that the district judge did not abuse dis-
cretion in rejecting a Rule 403 argument to exclude 
them. The court reiterated that the judge took the 
proper prophylactic steps to assure that no improper 
inference from the calls was drawn by the jury.
One judge concurred in the result. She disagreed 
that the judge properly admitted the California calls 
to prove knowledge and argued that nothing in those 
calls gave Richards the slightest reason to think that 
he would be carrying drugs rather than money when 
he left the Bolingbrook house. She observed that 
“pelon” is a Spanish word that means “Bald Guy” 
or “Baldy” and declined to infer anything more from 
the fact that a number of people called themselves 
“Pelon” than she would infer if  they called them-
selves “Shorty,” “Red-head,” or “Curly.” Thus, she 
argued that there was no evidence to tie Beltran to 
the people at the ranch.
The Propensity Argument
Although it found no error in the admission of the 
taped calls, the court of appeals unanimously con-
cluded that in its closing arguments the prosecution 
invited the jury to draw a propensity inference from 
the calls. The court clearly stated that after the judge 
admits other act evidence for a permissible purpose, 
the prosecution cannot later argue that the evidence 
shows the defendant’s propensity to deal drugs.
The court identified the “drug dealer” and “drug 
trafficker” language as an example of an improper 
propensity argument. It added that this was not 
the most glaring example and identified as even 
more glaring an argument by the prosecution that 
the defendant dealt drugs in California and must 
have done so in Illinois, too. The court concluded 
that the prosecution placed the forbidden propen-
sity inference at the center of its closing arguments 
and prejudiced Richards, because his credibility was 
crucial and the government’s propensity argument 
worked to attack that credibility.
Lessons
1. Other act evidence may not be admitted to 
prove propensity under Rule 404(b) and 
similar rules. It may only be admitted for a 
permissible purpose.
2. Evidence that a defendant may have been deal-
ing drugs on some occasion may amount to 
propensity evidence when offered to prove 
something such as knowledge when the other 
drug evidence is completely unrelated to the 
crime charged.
3. Once Rule 404(b)-type evidence is admitted for 
a proper purpose, the prosecution must take 
care in closing argument not to slip and make 
a propensity-based argument.
4. Where the defendant’s credibility is critical, 
propensity-based arguments may be especially 
prejudicial. n
